Turkey committing suicide with its anti-Kurdish policy

Political Analyst

ISTANBUL, (Kurdistan 24) - A leading commentator on trans-border Kurdish politics and researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Arzu Yilmaz argues that Turkey's increasingly anti-Kurdish policies at home and abroad are taking the country down a dangerous path that will prove difficult, if not impossible, to reverse.

A Kurd with roots in Turkey's Central Anatolia, Yilmaz is the former Chair of the Department of International Relations at the American University of Kurdistan (AUK) in the city of Duhok.

She recently spoke to a Kurdistan 24 correspondent in Istanbul regarding the challenges Kurdish people and their political representatives face vis-a-vis the states among which they have been divided as violence, shifting alliances, international interventions, and a myriad of uncertainties continue to unravel in the Middle East.

Below is a translation of the interview that the Kurdistan 24 Turkish website conducted with her. This English text supplements her answers with factual information in square brackets for international readers.

 

Q: Elections are taking place on May 12 in Iraq and June 24 in Turkey. How do you think Kurds are positioned in these two countries?

Yilmaz: Within the entities [states] they are supposed to be a part of, the Kurds are gradually becoming a divergent component because, due to unique political identity and preferences, they are not functioning as a part [of the states]. As is the case, they are still far from having a capacity to form a political union. In one sense, it is a limbo. They are neither able to create their own political accord nor can they become a meaningful part of the whole inside the borders they are included.

Q: The reasons being?

Yilmaz: Simply put, Iraq does not cease being Arab, and Turkey does not waive being Turkish. Both states are incapable of giving rise to a political project that would embrace the Kurd as a Kurd, and even worse, [they] view such a project as an existential threat for themselves. Let's have a look at Turkey.

The HDP [Peoples' Democratic Party], being the latest effort by Kurds to partake in Turkey's politics, found itself faced with the imprisonment of its co-leaders, the ouster of its lawmakers from the Parliament, and the central government's seizure of all of its municipalities.

And now [Turkish opposition parties] exclude it from talks on a presidential candidate and an electoral alliance [against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's administration.] This is an alarming state of affairs.

In Turkey, neither the government nor the opposition wants to come together with the pro-Kurdish party. Which means, they reject a project put forward by the Kurds, while at the same time not having one of their own. Under the circumstances, elections in Kurdish provinces [for them] appear to be a mere mandatory dull routine.

Q: How did Kurds end up here?

Yilmaz: The elections of June 7, 2015 were a breaking point in Turkey's history. The results then presented the Kurds with a chance to become partners in governance, along with a potential change in Turkey initiated by the Kurds. But that very situation led the [Erdogan's ruling Justice and Development Party] AKP, the opposition, and the whole Turkish state to take a stance against the HDP. Why did no [coalition] government emerge after June 7? Can we explain it solely through AKP's position? Why were snap elections held in November? So, the issue was not only about ambitions of the AKP to remain the single-party government, but it was also [about] support from the [Turkish] opposition to reverse the picture that emerged on June 7. Little has changed since.

Q: Is keeping the Kurds out of the political process a pattern we see only in Turkey?

Yilmaz: No, of course not. What happened in Kirkuk [the disputed territory's military takeover last year by Iraqi forces], and Afrin [the Syrian Kurdish town's recent invasion by Turkey] are a part of this picture.

Up until now, the Kurdish struggle was largely centered around the recognition of an ethnic people with its culture and language. But in the process we are currently going through, the issue is evolving into a territorial question. This means that the struggle is being consolidated across [the Greater] Kurdistan. This, in fact, is an inevitable consequence of what I mentioned as Turkey's persistence in remaining Turkish and Iraq's in being Arab.

It becomes a factor undermining the status quo in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria as well. In this context, Kurdistan is actually not "in the hearts," per se as [HDP lawmaker] Osman Baydemir said. Elections results, referenda, and conflict zones are slowly giving rise to Kurdistan and help shape its boundaries. However, this, in turn, causes an even more violent shunning of the Kurds in each part [of Kurdistan divided among the three states mentioned above, plus Iran]. It is a paradoxical situation, so it seems it is getting even more challenging to solve [peacefully] from now on.

Q: Had the Kurdistan Region not held the September 2017 independence referendum, would Kurds still have come under attack in Kirkuk?

Yilmaz: Some say if the September 25 referendum had been canceled, Kurdistan would not have faced this catastrophe [in Kirkuk and other disputed territories]. I would like to ask them, did the Rojava administration [Syrian Kurdistan] go to a referendum for independence in Afrin? Why [did Turkey] stage an operation in Afrin? No matter what the Kurdish parties propose, be it independence or autonomy, it seems that due to the territorial aspect of the question, their efforts will come to naught.

Q: Can the Kurds in Turkey go back to the circumstances of the electoral victory in June 2015 and Kurds of Iraq and Syria regain their territorial extension a year ago, before Kirkuk and Afrin?

Yilmaz: I think that opportunity is gone now. It is said Kurds everywhere are silent. People are silent because they feel they are on the eve of a broader and longer conflict. At the same, we do not have a policy that can promise a return to the days you mentioned. KDP [Kurdistan Democratic Party] failed in bringing independence for the Kurdistan Region. HDP similarly failed in its policy of belonging to Turkey. What have they put in place? Kurdish parties, too, are having difficulties in coming up with alternatives.

Q: What do you expect of election results in Iraq and Turkey?

Yilmaz: I think in both countries it will be much more challenging to provide stability after elections. It seems inevitable that Erdogan in Turkey and [PM Haider] al-Abadi in Iraq will win. They will both have won elections held under circumstances outside the rule of law, far from transparency, and [the same for] other criteria of legitimacy. Besides, both of them do not promise to resolve the ongoing conflicts [with Kurds] through compromise. Violent methods used by these governments with questionable legitimacy will eventually create [the kind of] chaos that neither Iraq nor Turkey seems able to avoid.

Q: And Kurds' expectations?

Yilmaz: There is not much of a hope [from the Turkish and Iraqi elections]. There is no viable solution on the table, currently. Kurds are trying to figure out how much more the current oppression can be increased or prolonged.

Q: How about the rumors of another round of peace process between Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Ankara?

Yilmaz: These are speculations directed at conservative Kurdish voters before the elections because conservative Kurdish voters play the key. It is about keeping those votes within, if not the AKP, the spectrum of right-wing [Turkish] parties.

Q: Can the US, as Turkey's NATO ally, and a backer of Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, help initiate new peace talks?

Yilmaz: A peaceful solution can emerge if Turkey-US relations are restructured within the framework of a strategic alliance, and one that includes the Kurds. Only then we can speak of new talks. But trends show that Turkey sees greater interest in cooperating with Russia against the United States. It is a bit difficult to await a new peace process, at least in the meantime, as long as there is no evidence that relations with the United States will improve.

In Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, the Kurdish issue, or rather the Kurdistan issue, used to be manageable even without a resolution. The point we have now reached makes that task more difficult for the regional actors and the international community. Iraq's funeral, so to speak, has so far been held three times. But because its inheritance could not be divided, it has not been buried. I do not know how many times Iraq's funeral will be held, but there is no Iraq alive now in the sense we once knew.

Turkey, on the other hand, is committing suicide right in front of our eyes. Iraq was killed, but Turkey, much like a person who is unable to manage his/her issues, is preparing its end with its own hands. At the end of the day, it is as clear as daylight that Kurds are not now and will not be responsible for what happens in Turkey. Nor were they responsible for the [failing] of Iraq and Syria. Still, it is not easy to foresee if the Kurds will choose for their own fate or reconnect their future with that of these states.

Editing by John J. Catherine

(Kurdistan 24 Turkish language website's Cesim Ilhan conducted this interview)