Saudi-Iranian confrontation, implications for Kurdish independence

Kurds have demonstrated that they possess more humane qualities, including re-spect for international norms, for which the U.S. and other world powers are searching among regional partners.

The Kurdish people have long suffered from the repressive and brutal character of neighboring regimes and the seemingly endless conflicts among them. The current confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran can be seen as one more chapter in that sorry saga. It has erupted at a time of intense turmoil, unusual even for this troubled region, and threatens to exacerbate existing conflicts. By contrast, in this same timeframe, Kurds have demonstrated that they possess more humane qualities, including respect for international norms, for which the U.S. and other world powers are searching among regional partners.

Saudi Arabia executed the Shi'ite cleric Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr last week for two basic reasons. The execution—by public beheading—was “widely popular” in Saudi Arabia, as the New York Times reported, and appealed to the country’s strict Sunni-Wahhabi sensibilities. Many Saudis see Iran expanding its reach through much of the region: in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. Already in October, Bahrain withdrew its ambassador from Iran, charging that Tehran was supporting terrorism there. With al-Nimr’s execution, Riyadh signaled that it was prepared to stand up for Sunnis against Shi'ite Iran.

King Salman, who assumed the Saudi throne last January, also demonstrated to his constituents that he is a ‘strong ruler,’ capable of enforcing such death sentences. Executing al-Nimr and 46 others, the vast bulk of them Sunni and convicted of involvement in al-Qaeda or Da'esh (Islamic State) terrorism. No foreign opposition dissuaded him, nor did he shirk from confronting domestic opponents. In this view, King Salman exercised a firm hand to 'preserve security' within the kingdom. As the Times suggested, “The collapse of authority across the region has fostered a fierce nationalism and a craving for strong, authoritarian gestures.”

These executions—the largest number since 1980, when the Saudis executed 63 people for laying siege to the Grand Mosque—certainly fit that mold. Indeed, under King Salman and his relatively inexperienced son, Mohammed, whom he appointed both Defense Minister and Deputy Crown Prince, the regime has exercised an unaccustomed boldness. Traditionally, Riyadh’s national security policy has been quiet and low-key, relying on the U.S. for its defense, while accommodating the dominant regional forces. The Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, which has continued inconclusively since last March, breaks with that tradition, as does Riyadh’s recent proposal for a (Sunni) Islamic coalition to fight terrorism.

Iran’s response to al-Nimr’s execution was unsurprising. After all, in 2011, mobs attacked the British embassy, following the imposition of international sanctions for Iran’s nuclear program, and Americans certainly recall the seizure of their own embassy in 1979. Following al-Nimr’s execution, the Saudi embassy in Tehran was attacked and burned, as was the Saudi consulate in Mashhad. Belatedly, the regime seemed to recognize that this thuggish response played directly into Saudi hands, and eventually brought the melee to an end after announcing the arrest of some 50 rioters.

Most Western countries view the execution of al-Nimr as an unnecessary provocation. Indeed, the U.N. Secretary-General said he was “deeply dismayed” by the executions, while France and Germany publicly condemned them. Privately, U.S. officials called al-Nimr’s execution a “dangerous game.” They are most concerned that the rise in sectarian tensions will make even more difficult two tasks that were already very challenging: achieving a political settlement in Syria and defeating Da'esh there and in Iraq.

One might contrast the actions of the leading Sunni and Shi'ite powers in the Middle East with that of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The KRG does not execute people to bolster its popularity. Nor does it encourage the sacking of foreign diplomatic missions. Nor is religious sectarianism an issue within the KRG. Indeed, last week, in a major meeting with representatives of 36 foreign countries, President Massoud Barzani told them that the Kurdistan Region would not be a party to the region’s sectarian conflict, affirming that “Sectarianism is a dangerous matter... The people of Kurdistan have no sectarian conflict.” Notably, Christians within the Kurdistan Region have recently joined the call for Kurdish independence. If civility, tolerance, and adherence to international norms are prerequisites for gaining national sovereignty, Kurds are far more qualified for independence than Iran or Saudi Arabia.

 

Laurie Ann Mylroie, Ph.D., wrote her dissertation on Saudi Arabia and then taught at Harvard University and the U.S. Naval War College. Most recently, she served as a cultural advisor to the U.S. military in Afghanistan.