Iraq experiments another bad idea before its collapse

Corruption, terrorism, ethno-sectarianism, economic decline, war with the Islamic State, internal displacement, anarchy, the list does not end. These are some of the responsibilities Haider al-Abadi was trusted with when he took his oath as Iraq’s Prime Minister in August 2014.

According to FFP’s Fragile States Index, Iraq has been on top of the “high alert” failed state category since the year it ratified its federal democratic constitution in 2005.

Indicators used across social, economic, political and military sectors display a worsening trend since 2014.This downgrading development explains Abadi’s cabinet reshuffling endeavor to turn the tides by establishing a technocratic government.

Abadi’s attempt to reform backfired as panic broke out in the parliament during three days of chaotic sessions from April 12 to 14, resulting in overnight protests, a fistfight and the disputed oust of the active speaker. The trigger of this turmoil was the list of nominees, unknown technocrats, that was presented by Abadi to the parliament on March 31.

This hopeless assembly provides a mirror reflection of endless irrational failed ideas in Iraq’s century old state fiasco.

The parliament blocs criticized the selection process of the technocrats by demanding their cabinet share based on the principle of party coalition government.

“Abadi preceded this process unilaterally by sidelining the parliament, which may further deter the crisis”, predicted Renas Jano, a Kurdish MP, in an interview in Erbil Airport before his airlift to Baghdad on April 11. On another occasion, Vahel Ali Balata, a communication’s representative at the Office of the Kurdistan Region Presidency asserts, “We support the idea of technocracy, but not without consultation process.”

Based on this, it is interesting to have a closer look at what the Prime minister actually intended to accomplish by taking such a drastic step. To this end, it is important to clarify the conceptual meaning of the terms technocrat and technocratic government in relation to the Iraqi political structure.  

In his initial statement when Abadi announced the idea of a technocrat government, he described his preferred candidates to be nonpartisan, merited, professional and academic. The best environment to promote officials by education or merit requires adequate social conditions, state of law, economic development, restricted corruption and fairness. None of which exist in Iraq.

A real technocratic prime minister or a minister is a politically independent assigned expert without record of public office for any party. A real technocratic government includes a majority of technocrat ministers led by a technocrat prime minster.

Political parties in Iraq are highly active at Universities and in Labor Unions, makes finding nominees that are nonpartisan academicians or professional very challenging. This also validates the argument made by the MP Ala Talabani who stated that Abadi should also replace himself to create a real technocratic government.

These facts question Abadi’s familiarity about his own idea in relation to his own country’s patron-clientele environment. Would it be too much to ask that the Prime Minister should have clarified these important conceptual conditions in order to make his ambition to establish an actual technocratic government more persuasive for Iraq’s political establishment?

As MP Jano argued, “We do not even have institutions to create technocrats. Abadi’s main concern should be planning a foundation to produce technocrats. His top-down approach to start from Baghdad is extremely insufficient.” The outcome of this action has therefore set the stage for a new phase of political disorder in Iraq that could result in ultimate collapse.

Although, he acted very clumsy to unilaterally reshuffle the cabinet based on a novel idea, it is unfair to blame everything on Abadi, who is simply reproducing the century old irrationality of trying to rule this abnormal Sykes-Picot state product. The artificial Iraqi identity was a British colonial oil scheme that was imposed on Kurds, Shia, Sunnis and all the other minorities by force. Therefore, it is logical that these ethno-sectarian entities never managed to create a peaceful coexistence as one integrated nation.

Ideas are not the problem. Iraq is the problem.

Monarchy, dictatorship, republicanism, secularism, unitary state, autonomy, constitutional parliamentary,federalism, democracy, Islamic legislation, centralization, decentralization and ethno-sectarian power-sharing-partnership, each and everyone one of these ideas has been experimented but failed to deliver a functional government. Any objective observer of Iraq’s history can confirm this view.

If one century of Machiavellian politics is not enough to acknowledge that Kurds, Shia and Sunnis need a roadmap to separate peacefully into their own nation states, then the deepening security dilemma and the militarization of these entities will enter an unprecedented phase of violent breakdown.

Generating a unique agreement for a nonviolent separation process of Iraq based on ethnic and sectarian lines should be the final prioritized idea of the politicians in the Baghdad Assembly.

Editing by Delovan Barwari