From Transition to Inclusion: Reflections on Syria’s Interim Governance

By Dr. Mohammed Ihsan
Senior Professor, Yale University

Syria’s transitional leadership, under Ahmad al-Sharaa, faces an extraordinarily complex task: guiding a deeply fractured society toward political stability after decades of authoritarian rule and years of devastating conflict. In this context, a number of decisions and policy orientations have raised important questions about how the transition is being managed and about the kind of state that may ultimately emerge.

At the heart of current concerns lies a fundamental issue of interpretation: whether the post-Assad moment is understood primarily as a victory over an entrenched system of rule, or more broadly as a mandate to reshape society itself. For more than five decades, Syria was governed by the Assad family and a narrow security and economic elite that included individuals from multiple sects. Entire communities did not govern the country, nor can they be held collectively responsible for the crimes of that system. A successful transition therefore requires a clear distinction between accountability for individuals and respect for the social fabric of the nation.

Some recent political discourse and administrative practices have, however, been perceived by segments of Syrian society as emphasizing collective categories over individual responsibility. This has generated concern that the line between dismantling an authoritarian order and reproducing aspects of exclusionary governance may be becoming blurred. Experience across the region suggests that durable stability is more likely to emerge from inclusion, dialogue, and institutional pluralism than from centralized authority alone.

Questions have also been raised about the concentration of decision-making within a limited political circle, including figures associated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Rather than establishing a broadly participatory transitional framework, political processes have appeared constrained, with limited space for alternative voices. This has contributed to perceptions—whether fully intended or not—that one restrictive system may be replacing another, rather than giving way to a genuinely open political order.

Syria’s diversity is not an abstract principle; it is a lived reality shaped by multiple nationalities, ethnicities, religions, and sects. Any political project that does not fully acknowledge this pluralism risks weakening the social foundations of the state. Calls for Syrians to engage politically only as abstract individuals, detached from their Kurdish, Druze, or Alawite identities, are often experienced not as neutral universalism but as insufficiently responsive to historical grievances and unequal citizenship.

The Kurdish issue illustrates these challenges with particular clarity. Kurds constitute Syria’s second-largest ethnic group, and the majority are Sunni Muslims. Many had hoped that the transitional period would open a new chapter of partnership in rebuilding the state. Instead, policies perceived as securitized or exclusionary have generated mistrust, turning potential cooperation into political distance. This dynamic has complicated national cohesion and reduced the space for constructive engagement.

A more integrative path remains available. Without challenging Syria’s sovereignty or its Arab cultural heritage, the transitional leadership could pursue nationally unifying measures such as constitutional recognition of Syria as a multinational and multireligious state; guarantees for mother-tongue education alongside Arabic; recognition of Nowruz as a national holiday; and equitable access for all communities to political, cultural, and media institutions. These steps would not fragment the state, but rather strengthen it through mutual recognition and shared ownership.

There are also broader questions of legitimacy and sovereignty. The transitional authority has understandably relied on regional and international support in navigating a highly complex environment. Yet long-term legitimacy is most sustainable when it is rooted in domestic consensus and inclusive political participation. External engagement can assist a transition, but it cannot substitute for internal social and political trust.

Security policy has likewise become an area of public concern. The integration of foreign fighters with controversial backgrounds into military structures has raised questions about the character of emerging state institutions. Reports of civilian abuses in coastal regions and in Suwayda, coupled with limited transparency in accountability mechanisms, have further strained confidence among affected communities. Addressing such concerns openly and credibly would represent an important step toward national reconciliation.

t is equally essential to avoid narratives that portray any community as monolithic. Many Sunni Arabs in Syria, like members of other groups, reject collective punishment, oppose sectarian governance, and seek a civic state grounded in equal citizenship. Policies or rhetoric that appear to generalize about communities risk deepening polarization rather than overcoming it.

Syria today stands at a historic crossroads. The end of the Assad era created a rare opportunity to build a political order based on citizenship, justice, and equality before the law. That opportunity remains real, but it is fragile. Stability will not be secured by replacing one centralized authority with another, but by constructing institutions that reflect the country’s social complexity and political aspirations.

If Syria’s transitional leadership seeks enduring legitimacy, it must place inclusion at the center of governance. Recognition of diversity, accountability for abuses, and genuine political partnership with all components of society are not concessions; they are the pillars of any viable Syrian state. With such an approach, the transition can become not merely a change in leadership, but the foundation of a more just and cohesive future.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Kurdistan24.