After the Coalition: Iraq's Harder Fight Over Weapons and Power

ERBIL (Kurdistan24) - Iraq's campaign to bring all weapons under state authority is entering a more consequential phase as Baghdad prepares for the changing role of the International Coalition, raising a question that reaches beyond the presence of foreign troops: can the government dismantle the political system that has allowed armed power to become a source of influence inside the state?

For years, the presence of US-led Coalition forces has been cited by Iraqi armed factions as a central justification for maintaining weapons outside conventional state institutions. But the debate is becoming harder to explain through that argument alone.

The challenge is increasingly tied to Iraq's domestic political structure, competing security institutions, economic networks and the role of armed factions in political decision-making.

At the center of the dispute is a government deadline of Sept. 30 for bringing weapons under state control.

Beyond the Foreign Presence

Dr. Ayad al-Anbar, a professor of political thought at the University of Kufa, told Kurdistan24 that Sept. 30 could mark a decisive turning point.

He described the date as a potential "starting point" because it could remove one of the principal political arguments used to justify weapons outside the state's framework: resistance to foreign military presence.

According to al-Anbar, once that justification weakens, the government's ability to enforce state authority will face a direct test.

He said the settlement of the issue would also test the credibility of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's political program and the parties that supported it, arguing that those forces would be expected to honor commitments to end armed activity outside official institutions.

The implication is significant. If foreign troops are no longer the principal explanation for parallel weapons, Baghdad will have to confront why some factions continue to regard military power as necessary for political influence.

From Resistance to Political Leverage

Over the past two decades, the function of armed groups in Iraq has changed repeatedly.

Weapons that were initially justified in the context of resisting foreign forces and fighting ISIS have acquired a broader political function.

The country's system of muhasasa, or power-sharing based largely on political and communal bargaining, has often encouraged rival blocs to protect their influence through institutions, patronage networks and, in some cases, armed formations.

This has created what al-Anbar describes as a form of political empowerment in which military capability can become a bargaining instrument.

Weapons can therefore serve not only battlefield purposes but also as a source of leverage during government formation, political disputes and crises.

That makes disarmament fundamentally different from collecting unauthorized firearms. It becomes a question of whether political actors are willing to surrender a mechanism through which they have accumulated influence.

The PMF Creates a Legal Gray Area

The problem becomes more complicated because many armed formations operate within the Popular Mobilization Forces, which were formally incorporated into Iraq's security institutions.

That arrangement has created what the report describes as a "structural duality": formations may have a recognized place within the state while retaining political identities, separate chains of influence and capabilities associated with non-state armed actors.

This makes the distinction between state-sanctioned and unauthorized weapons particularly difficult.

The government's challenge is therefore not simply to declare that arms belong to the state.

It must determine who controls the weapons, who gives operational orders, which institutions supervise them and whether political organizations can retain independent military capacity.

Without resolving those questions, formal integration could leave the underlying duality intact.

Government Faces a Test of Political Will

Political researcher Suhad al-Shammari told Kurdistan24 that the Zaidi government has made weapons control one of its principal priorities alongside the fight against corruption.

She said the government program is built around two strategic objectives: "combating corruption" and "restricting weapons to the state."

Al-Shammari argued that the Sept. 30 deadline reflects what she called a "solid governmental will" to move Iraq into a different phase, one centered on state sovereignty and economic diversification.

But the real test, she suggested, will be whether that political will survives confrontation with entrenched interests.

The government faces factions with political representation, military capacity and deep organizational networks. Negotiating with them while preparing to enforce the law creates a difficult balance between compromise and coercion.

Armed Groups Are Linked to a Wider Regional System

Another obstacle is the regional dimension of Iraq's armed factions.

Some groups do not view their security role strictly through the lens of the Iraqi state. Instead, they see themselves as part of a wider regional axis with political and military relationships extending beyond Iraq's borders.

That means their decisions can be influenced by regional developments involving Iran, the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia and other actors.

The issue consequently extends beyond Baghdad's relationship with Washington.

Even if the final foreign troops leave, regional tensions may continue providing armed groups with reasons to retain military capabilities.

That is why the Coalition's withdrawal, by itself, may not produce the transformation Baghdad wants.

A Parallel Economy Adds Another Layer

The weapons issue is also tied to economic power.

Armed networks have developed access to commercial and political resources, including influence over border crossings, contracts and informal markets. In some cases, political and security networks overlap with economic activity.

That creates another incentive to preserve parallel structures.

Disarmament, under such circumstances, could threaten not only military capabilities but also the revenue streams that sustain political organizations and their networks.

A successful state-control policy would therefore require stronger customs enforcement, financial oversight and institutional accountability alongside security reforms.

The Air-Defense Argument

One of the most persistent arguments for retaining advanced weapons is Iraq's perceived weakness in air defense.

Some factions point to gaps in the country's ability to protect its airspace and strategic infrastructure, arguing that drones, missiles and other capabilities are necessary to compensate for deficiencies within the official armed forces.

That argument gives the government another challenge: building credible national defense capabilities quickly enough to remove the perceived need for parallel military systems.

If Iraq can provide effective air defense and border protection through recognized institutions, one of the strongest practical arguments for independent military capability would weaken.

What Full Sovereignty Would Require

The central question facing Baghdad is therefore larger than the withdrawal of the International Coalition.

A state monopoly on weapons would require a political system in which armed power is no longer necessary to secure political influence; security institutions that are genuinely capable of defending the country; economic networks that do not depend on parallel armed structures; and regional arrangements that reduce the incentive for Iraqi territory to become a battlefield for external rivalries.

It would also require confidence among Iraq's political and social components that state institutions can protect citizens impartially.

That issue is particularly important for communities concerned that the departure of international forces could simply replace one security vacuum with another.

Sept. 30 Is Only the Beginning

The Sept. 30 deadline may provide Baghdad with a clear political target, but it is unlikely to resolve Iraq's parallel-arms problem on its own.

As al-Anbar suggested, it could instead become the moment when the government's intentions are tested against the country's political realities.

The question is no longer simply whether Iraq can remove a foreign military presence.

It is whether Baghdad can build a state strong enough that no political faction needs its own army, no armed network requires its own economic system, and no external power can rely on Iraqi groups to pursue regional conflicts.

That would make the transition beyond the Coalition more than a military timetable. It would make it a test of whether Iraq can finally replace competing centers of power with a single, accountable state authority.