Where Did the Head of Syria’s Transitional Authority, Ahmad al-Sharaa, Go Wrong Toward the Kurdish People and Toward Syria as a Whole?

By Dr Mohammed Ihsan
Senior Professor at Yale University 

The head of Syria’s transitional authority, Ahmad al Sharaa, has made a series of grave political and moral errors in his approach to Syria’s diverse communities. These mistakes have not been limited to the Kurdish population, but have affected nearly all components of Syrian society. At the core of the problem lies a dangerous misconception: treating the post Assad moment as a victory over the Syrian people, rather than a victory over the Assad regime itself.

For more than five decades, Syria was ruled by the Assad family and a narrow security and economic elite that included individuals from multiple sects. Entire communities did not govern the country, nor can they be held collectively responsible for the crimes of that system. Yet the transitional authority has increasingly adopted a discourse that implies collective guilt and justifies exclusion and punishment at the level of communities rather than individuals.

This approach reflects an intoxication with power that blurs the line between dismantling authoritarian rule and reproducing it in a new form. Defeating a dictatorship does not grant the right to dominate society, impose political obedience, or marginalize dissenting voices. History across the region demonstrates that such behavior leads not to stability, but to renewed authoritarianism and conflict.

The concentration of power within a narrow circle linked to Hay’at Tahrir al Sham has deepened these concerns. Instead of building an inclusive transitional framework, political participation has been restricted, while alternative voices have been sidelined. This has created the perception that one exclusionary system is being replaced by another, rather than dismantled altogether.

Syria’s pluralism is not a theoretical concept. It is a lived reality shaped by multiple nationalities, ethnicities, religions, and sects. Any political project that ignores this diversity or attempts to erase it in the name of unity risks tearing the country apart from within. Calls for Syrians to engage politically only as abstract individuals, stripped of their Kurdish, Druze, or Alawite identities, have been perceived not as inclusive, but as dismissive of historical injustice and legitimate grievances.

The Kurdish issue illustrates this failure with particular clarity. Kurds constitute Syria’s second largest ethnic group, and the majority are Sunni Muslims. Instead of engaging them as equal partners in rebuilding the state, the transitional authority has adopted exclusionary and securitized policies that have transformed potential allies into adversaries. This approach has weakened national cohesion and strengthened rival actors rather than marginalizing them.

A more constructive path was available. Without undermining Syria’s sovereignty or Arab cultural identity, the transitional leadership could have taken several nationally unifying steps. These include constitutional recognition of Syria as a multi national and multi religious state, guarantees for mother tongue education alongside Arabic, recognition of Nowruz as a national holiday, and equal access for all communities to political, cultural, and media institutions. Such measures would have built trust rather than resentment.

Serious concerns also surround questions of sovereignty and legitimacy. Rather than grounding its authority primarily in domestic consensus, the transitional leadership has relied heavily on regional and international backing. While foreign engagement is unavoidable, legitimacy dependent on external actors is inherently fragile and often comes at a cost to national independence.

Security policy has further damaged trust. The incorporation of foreign fighters with extremist backgrounds into military structures has undermined the credibility of the armed forces as a national institution. Reports of abuses against civilians in coastal areas and in Suwayda, followed by the absence of transparent and credible accountability, have deepened communal wounds and reinforced fears of sectarian governance.

It is equally important to reject the narrative that frames Sunni Arabs as a monolithic or inherently sectarian group. Many Sunni Arabs in Syria oppose collective punishment, reject sectarian rule, and seek a civic state based on equal citizenship. Policies that stigmatize them alongside others only serve to intensify polarization.

Syria today stands at a critical crossroads. The fall of the Assad regime created a rare opportunity to establish a state founded on citizenship, justice, and equality before the law. That opportunity remains fragile. Replacing one authoritarian order with another, even under revolutionary rhetoric, will not stabilize the country or heal its divisions.

If Syria’s transitional authority seeks genuine and lasting legitimacy, it must abandon the logic of domination and embrace inclusive governance. Recognition of diversity, accountability for abuses, and political partnership with all components of society are not concessions. They are the foundations of any viable Syrian state. Without such a shift, Syria risks reliving its past under a different name and a different set of rulers.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Kurdistan24.