Can the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) Survive in a Changing Syria?

Following weeks of fighting, ceasefire violations, and the retreat of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from areas such Aleppo, Deir-E-Zor and Raqqa, a new comprehensive agreement between Damascus and the SDF has been struck, the details of which are beginning to emerge. The agreement outlines a phased implementation plan for both the military integration of the SDF into the Syrian armed forces and for the merger or joint administration of civilian institutions in the country’s north-east, including the area known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). 

What went wrong for the SDF, which had controlled nearly 1/3 of Syrian territory and all of its oil sources, enjoyed American military and financial support, and was, at times, seen as one of the strongest military actors in Syria’s protracted conflict? While some blame the Syrian government and the retreat of American support, others point out that SDF itself was seen as an occupation force by many Arabs in Raqqa and Deir-E-Zor. 

The clashes in recent weeks have shown that two visions about the future of Syria have consolidated: One promoted by Kurdish groups, such as the SDF and the Kurdish National Council (KNC), as well as many other non-majority communities such as Alawite and Druze leaders, who are arguing for a more inclusive transition process and a new Syria that truly reflects its cultural, ethnic, religious and historic diversity. The new government in Damascus on the other side, has consistently pushed for a Syria that it would rule and control, including, if necessary, by force. Their vision focuses on Sunni Arab nationalism and moderate Islamism, and is characterized by centralization and a strong executive dominance. 

A long line of political science research demonstrates that states, particularly those with religious and ethnic diversity, can follow either a path of integration or a path of accommodation. Integration consolidates around a single public identity – typically that of the majority – while accommodation supports the granting of minority rights and the establishment of power-sharing provisions.  Which vision will prevail in Syria? We are outlining three potential future scenarios.  

In a first scenario – which foresees a violent integration of AANES into the central state framework – violence will escalate and Syrian government-affiliated groups will continue their military campaign against Kobane and march towards other Kurdish-majority territories. They receive support from Turkey by air and from the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) troops from the North-West. Further attacks on the remaining SDF-controlled territory have some observers fearing that similar massacres to those in Alawite territories in March 2025 or in Druze territories in July 2025 might take place. A full military amalgamation of the SDF into the Syrian army, the dissolution of AANES, and the deployment of mainly Arab troops will likely follow, but be unlikely to secure stability in Syria, or indeed, in the region. 

A second scenario could set the country on a path of accommodation. In mid-January, Presidential Decree No. 13 officially recognized the rights of Kurds for the first time in Syrian history, making Kurdish a national language, Nowruz a national holiday, and extending the right to education in Kurdish. A follow-on executive order calls for citizenship to be extended to all Kurdish residents. These principles are in line with the Constitutional Declaration of March 2025 and are consistent with Kurdish aspirations. One might look to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as a potential example of what to expect. It would be important to clarify the relationship with Damascus and to ensure Kurdish representation in central state institutions. Moreover, the rights set out for the Kurds – and for any other community – need to go beyond Presidential Decrees and agreements between political leaders to be incorporated into a permanent constitutional framework in the future. 

A third scenario would be moving back and forth between attempts at centralization though violent reintegration and efforts at negotiated accommodation. This has been the strategy of President Al-Sharaa and the authorities in Damascus so far – who have shown that they are prepared to use force to meet their objectives but also the “carrot” of negotiations, group rights, and limited autonomy when needed. Often, Al-Sharaa’s rhetoric has been moderate, promising inclusion, democratization and consensual decision-making, while actions on the ground highlight a pattern of violence instigated not by Syrian Army forces directly, but by allied forces. Al-Sharaa’s transitional government includes a Kurdish, Druze and Alawite, as well as a Christian minister, and he has aimed to include the different communities in his selection of the members of Parliament. However, these appointments have been critiqued by the groups themselves, claiming that the chosen representatives have no affiliation to core parties, organizations or civil society movements and consequently enjoy no legitimacy to speak on behalf of their group. In this scenario, AANES would remain all but a shell of itself, and Damascus would aim to take control of all major decisions, but permitting the appearance of special rights. 

Which scenario will prevail will depend on three factors. First, the details of the most recent agreement between AANES representatives and the Damascus government will need to be confirmed and given practical effect. Second, much will depend on whether what has been agreed is fully implemented – a key challenge for ceasefires and peace agreements, as well as constitutional provisions and power-sharing arrangements. The failure to make headway on the March 2025 agreement on the military and civilian integration was a precursor to this last round of clashes. Third, and possibly most importantly, the sustainability of any agreement will require not only internal peace and elite commitment but also external support from neighbouring countries and core international actors. This has been a challenge with actors from Turkey to Israel, the USA to Russia and the Gulf countries all having vested interested in Syria’s political transition. It remains to be seen if peaceful integration or accommodation can occur amid these challenging circumstances.