Houthi Smuggling Network Exposed by Detained Sailors

ERBIL (Kurdistan24) — Extraordinary confessions from detained sailors have peeled back the curtain on a vast and sophisticated weapons smuggling network, allegedly operated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), that funnels arms from Iranian ports to Houthi militants in Yemen through a complex web of international routes, according to a detailed reports published by the news outlet Asharq Al-Awsat.

The revelations, which stem from the interrogations of seven crew members arrested by Yemeni forces in the Red Sea in July, provide a rare and granular look into the logistical underworld sustaining the long-running conflict, implicating multiple countries as unwitting transit points in a clandestine supply chain that originates in Iran and terminates in the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah.

The detailed accounts of the network’s operations were first brought to public light through broadcasts on al-Joumhouriya television, a channel run by the Yemeni national resistance based on the country's western coast. According to the Asharq Al-Awsat reports, the confessions outline a significant smuggling enterprise that utilizes diverse and deceptive pathways, reportedly running through Beirut, Damascus, Somalia, and Djibouti to deliver its illicit cargo.

The testimony of four sailors in particular—identified as Amer Masawa, Ali Qassir, Issa Qassir, and Abdullah Afifi—forms the core of the disclosures, painting a vivid picture of recruitment, elaborate travel arrangements, and carefully concealed weapons shipments moving from Iran’s Bandar Abbas port directly into the heart of Houthi-held territory.

The journey of Amer Masawa, as detailed in his confession reported by Asharq Al-Awsat, began in 2023 when a Houthi official in Hodeidah tasked him with a specific mission: to travel to Iran and return a ship to Yemen. This assignment set in motion a multi-stage international journey designed to obscure the mission's true purpose.

Masawa and his fellow recruits first traveled to the Houthi-controlled capital of Sanaa, where they were issued passports. From there, their path was meticulously managed by a network of handlers. They boarded a commercial Yemenia Airways flight to Amman, the capital of Jordan, marking the first leg of their circuitous route. Upon arrival in the Lebanese capital of Beirut, the group was met by an escort, described as a man in his 60s, who led them to a pre-arranged apartment where they waited for three days.

The next phase involved a clandestine car journey across the border into Syria, bringing them to Damascus. From the Syrian capital, they were finally able to board a flight to Tehran, the epicenter of the operation.

Once in Iran, the sailors were reportedly handed over to another escort who brought them to a Houthi-run camp under the command of a leading Houthi figure named Mohammed al-Talebi. According to the Asharq Al-Awsat report, Yemeni authorities have identified al-Talebi as a key Houthi representative for the smuggling network operating out of Iran.

After a ten-day period in the Tehran camp, the group was flown to the southern port city of Bandar Abbas. There, they were housed in a villa owned by al-Talebi himself, who proceeded to brief them on the details of their smuggling mission. It was in Bandar Abbas that their crew was augmented by the arrival of ten Somali sailors, who were to join them on the voyage back to Yemen.

A second detailed account, provided by sailor Ali Qassir and reported by Asharq Al-Awsat, reveals a completely different but equally elaborate recruitment and travel route, demonstrating the network's operational flexibility.

Ali Qassir recounted being recruited by individuals connected to Hussein al-Attas, a Houthi official based at Hodeidah’s al-Salif port. Instead of traveling by air through the Levant, Qassir and his group were taken on a grueling overland journey. They were first transported to the Jowf province, east of Sanaa, where they met another smuggler. This guide escorted them along a desolate desert route that snaked through the Yemeni provinces of Jawf, Marib, and Hadramawt, eventually reaching the al-Mahra province, which borders Oman.

At the Sarfait border crossing, another smuggler facilitated their entry into Oman, where they were handed off to yet another contact who took them to the city of Salalah. After a three-day layover, they were moved to the Omani capital, Muscat, from which they were flown to Bandar Abbas in Iran. Upon arrival, they were taken to the same Houthi-run camp and joined the other sailors, including the ten Somalis, to receive their mission briefing from Mohammed al-Talebi.

The confessions also shed light on the methods of deception used to conceal the true nature of the cargo from the crew and outside observers.

According to the testimony of Issa Qassir, Ali’s brother, the sailors were divided into two groups for the return voyage and were told they were transporting legitimate commercial goods. They were informed their vessel was loaded with children’s toys, power generators, and, notably, boxes of cancer treatment medication, with specific instructions that the latter must be kept refrigerated at all times—a detail that added a layer of credibility to the cover story.

Another sailor confessed that the crew was unaware of the vessel's true contents, believing they were transporting harmless items such as battering and construction equipment. The deception was only uncovered when the Yemeni coastguard eventually intercepted their vessel, boarded it, and discovered the illegal shipment, which included rockets and other advanced weaponry.

The perilous nature of the sea journey was highlighted by an incident recounted by the sailors. According to Asharq Al-Awsat, their vessel experienced a mechanical failure while sailing off the Omani coast. In a moment of high-stakes irony, the smugglers were forced to contact Omani authorities for assistance. They were subsequently transported to Muscat and remained there for ten days while their ship underwent repairs, all without their illicit cargo apparently being detected.

Once the repairs were complete, they resumed their journey towards Yemen. This incident not only underscores a potential vulnerability in their operation but also illustrates their ability to operate under a cloak of normalcy, even interacting directly with state authorities without raising suspicion.

Synthesizing the various confessions, the reports in Asharq Al-Awsat outline that the IRGC allegedly utilized at least three primary smuggling corridors from Iran. The first was a direct sea route from Bandar Abbas to the Houthi port of al-Salif. The second and third routes were more indirect, running through the waters off Somalia and Djibouti, respectively, before ultimately converging on al-Salif. The sailors also revealed critical details about their tactics to evade detection in the heavily patrolled waters of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

They stated that international maritime patrols had never intercepted their vessels. To avoid the Yemeni coastguard and national resistance forces, they employed specific evasion techniques, such as crossing the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait only under the cover of darkness and deliberately sailing to the west of the designated international shipping route, a path less scrutinized by naval patrols. These revelations, taken together, expose a highly organized, well-funded, and strategically sophisticated effort to arm Houthi forces in direct defiance of international law and maritime security protocols.