‘We Need to Export Kurdistan's Oil to European Markets via the Port of Ceyhan,’ Says Iraqi MP
The deputy head of the Iraqi Parliament's Oil and Gas Committee, Adnan Jabiri emphasized that Baghdad wants to renew the pipeline contract with Türkiye "at any cost" to ensure the delivery of oil from both the Kurdistan Region and a portion of Kirkuk's fields to global markets.

ERBIL (Kurdistan24) — A critical deadline set by Iraq's Federal Oil Minister for the resumption of the Kurdistan Region's northern oil exports has quietly passed, plunging the much-anticipated restart into a state of profound uncertainty and revealing a complex web of logistical hurdles, internal policy debates in Baghdad, and unresolved high-stakes negotiations with Türkiye.
More than 48 hours after the moment designated by Iraqi Oil Minister Hayyan Abdul Ghani, not a single barrel of the initial 80,000 barrels per day has been exported, leaving international markets, oil companies, and regional stakeholders waiting for clarity on a situation that holds significant economic consequences for both Erbil and Baghdad. The impasse highlights not only immediate challenges but also a looming contractual deadline with Türkiye that threatens the long-term viability of the entire Iraq-Türkiye Pipeline (ITP) as a strategic conduit for Kurdish and Kirkuk oil to vital European markets.
The week's developments began with a wave of official optimism.
On Wednesday, Aug. 6, 2025, Hayyan Abdul Ghani, in his dual capacity as Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs and Minister of Oil, made a definitive announcement at a press conference that seemed to signal the end of a long and costly hiatus.
“Today or tomorrow," the minister declared, "we will begin receiving 80,000 barrels of oil produced from the oil fields of the Kurdistan Region and will export it via the company 'SOMO' to the Turkish port of Ceyhan.”
This statement was widely interpreted as the final green light for the resumption of flows, which have been halted for an extended period, depriving Iraq of significant revenues and impacting the Kurdistan Region's economy. However, as of Saturday, Aug. 9, 2025, the pipeline to Ceyhan remains dormant. The minister's confident timeline has expired without any oil being received or exported, leaving a conspicuous silence in its wake.
Adding to the complexity of the situation, Iraq's State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) issued an official statement indicating its full operational readiness. The company announced that it has made all necessary preparations to manage the resumption of the Kurdistan Region's oil exports and has successfully finalized the requisite contracts with the international oil companies producing in the region.
According to its communication, SOMO is now simply awaiting the physical receipt of the crude oil from the Kurdistan Region to commence the export process. Notably, SOMO’s statement conspicuously avoided setting any new deadline, a detail that suggests the current delay stems from issues beyond its logistical and commercial control, placing the onus back on the political and operational agreements between Baghdad and Erbil.
Amid this uncertainty, key figures within the Iraqi Parliament's Oil and Gas Committee have weighed in, offering perspectives that underscore both the challenges and the strategic imperatives driving the push for a resolution.
Ali Mashkoor, a committee member, noted the prolonged nature of the export halt and highlighted how the federal government has managed the shortfall. He stated that "the export of Kurdistan's oil has been halted for a long time, and Iraq has compensated for this amount from the fields in Basra."
Despite the current stalemate, he expressed a degree of confidence in an eventual breakthrough, remarking, "In my opinion, at this stage, both sides (Erbil and Baghdad) will reach an agreement on resuming exports." His assessment points to an underlying belief that the mutual economic necessity will ultimately override the persistent political and technical disagreements.
However, a significant complication has emerged from within the Iraqi Ministry of Oil itself, involving the final destination of the Kurdish crude.
According to reports, the Ministry is contemplating a plan to use the initial 80,000 barrels per day slated to be received from the Kurdistan Region for domestic consumption rather than immediate export. This consideration is driven by the high production and transportation costs associated with the northern export route.
Under this proposal, the federal government would, in return, increase the volume of oil it exports from its southern fields in Basra to offset the amount. While this could be a pragmatic solution for Baghdad's domestic refining needs, it raises fresh questions about the revenue-sharing mechanism and the financial implications for the Kurdistan Region. Furthermore, this internal deliberation points to a significant problem facing Baghdad: Türkiye's non-renewal of the Ceyhan oil pipeline agreement.
The unresolved pipeline agreement with Ankara has become arguably the single largest obstacle.
The deputy head of the Iraqi Parliament's Oil and Gas Committee, Adnan Jabiri, provided a detailed explanation of the strategic importance of this issue, framing it as a matter of national economic security.
Jabiri emphasized that Baghdad wants to renew the pipeline contract with Türkiye "at any cost" to ensure the delivery of oil from both the Kurdistan Region and a portion of Kirkuk's fields to global markets.
His argument centers on the pipeline’s irreplaceable role in supplying European customers. "We need to export Kurdistan's oil to European markets via the port of Ceyhan," he stated. He elaborated that "European countries cannot easily receive Iraqi oil through the Gulf countries and the port of Basra due to the long distances."
For these nations, "the port of Ceyhan is the closest location." The risk, as Jabiri articulated it, is existential for a key segment of Iraq's customer base: "Iraq does not want to lose its European customers." His comments cast the pipeline not merely as infrastructure, but as a critical artery for maintaining market share and geopolitical ties in Europe.
This overarching contractual dilemma with Türkiye casts a long shadow over any potential short-term fix. Even if Erbil and Baghdad were to resolve the immediate issues surrounding the initial 80,000 barrels, a far more significant deadline is looming. The broader, long-term agreement governing the entire pipeline's operation between Iraq and Türkiye is set to expire next July.
To ensure the continuation of any oil exports through this route beyond that date, both countries must successfully negotiate and sign a new, comprehensive contract. This future cliff-edge means that the current impasse is not just a temporary hiccup, but potentially a preview of a much more difficult and consequential negotiation required to secure the future of Iraq's northern export corridor. Until then, the promise of renewed oil flows remains unfulfilled, suspended between a missed deadline and an uncertain future.
Kurdistan24 correspondent Dilan Barzan contributed to this report.