Maliki Softens Stance on Sudani as Iraq Enters a Fraught Caretaker Phase
Maliki confirms no veto on Sudani seeking a second term, urging swift leadership votes, while the Federal Court’s caretaker ruling sparks economic fears.
ERBIL (Kurdistan24) – The complex and often fractious landscape of Iraqi politics witnessed a significant development on Saturday, November 22, 2025, as Nouri al-Maliki, the head of the State of Law Coalition, publicly clarified the position of the powerful Coordination Framework regarding the future leadership of the country. In a statement that could reshape the negotiations for the next government, the former Prime Minister announced that there is no veto preventing current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani from assuming the premiership for a second term.
However, this potential political breakthrough coincides with a precarious legal and economic reality, as a recent Federal Court decision dissolving the legislature and converting the executive branch into a caretaker government has triggered widespread anxiety regarding the nation’s financial stability.
Maliki’s Olive Branch
Nouri al-Maliki, a pivotal figure in Iraq’s post-2003 political order, addressed the media on Saturday to dispel rumors suggesting an internal blockade against Sudani within the ruling Shiite coalition.
Speaking from Baghdad, Maliki formally announced that "there is no decision within the Coordination Framework to prevent Sudani from the position of Prime Minister of Iraq."
This declaration removes a significant theoretical hurdle for Sudani, who has been navigating the delicate balance of power between various factions within the Framework.
However, Maliki’s endorsement was not without caveats. He was careful to indicate that the path to the premiership is not automatic, stating that "the Coordination Framework has set special criteria and conditions for the next Prime Minister."
This suggests that while Sudani is not barred from the role, he—or any other candidate—must navigate a rigorous vetting process designed to align the next government’s agenda with the Framework's strategic priorities.
The head of the State of Law Coalition also provided an optimistic timeline for the transition of power, asserting that the formation of the new government is fundamentally a matter of political will.
"Government formation depends on consensus, and it can be formed within a month after the ratification of the election results," Maliki indicated. This projection of a one-month timeline underscores a desire among the political elite to avoid the protracted stalemates that have plagued previous government formation processes in Iraq, which often dragged on for months or even years.
The Constitutional Deadlock
Maliki’s comments also highlighted the interdependent nature of Iraq’s ethno-sectarian power-sharing arrangement.
For the Prime Minister to be designated, the constitutional chain of events requires the prior election of a Speaker of Parliament and a President of the Republic. Addressing this necessity, Maliki issued a direct call to action to the country’s Kurdish and Sunni political forces. He indicated that "the Kurds must speed up the election of the President of the Republic, and the Sunnis [must] elect the Speaker of Parliament."
This urgency stems from the recent conclusion of the general elections for the sixth term of Parliament. The electoral process, a critical stress test for Iraq's democracy, concluded earlier this month.
The special voting for security forces and internally displaced persons took place on Sunday, November 9, 2025, followed two days later by the general voting across all governorates of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region on Tuesday.
According to official statistics released by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), the participation rates reflected a disparity between the disciplined voting of state apparatuses and the broader public.
The participation rate in the special voting was recorded at a robust 82.42%, while the general voting turnout was approximately 54.35%. While the general turnout reflects a functional democratic exercise, the subsequent ratification of these results serves as the starting gun for the thirty-day clock Maliki referenced.
A Caretaker Crisis
While the political maneuvering for positions takes center stage, a shadow has been cast over the daily governance of Iraq following a decisive ruling by the Federal Court. The court has issued a decision to dissolve the sitting government and parliament, formally changing their status to "caretaker."
This legal transformation effectively strips the current administration of its full executive powers, limiting it to handling daily affairs without the authority to make major strategic decisions or fiscal commitments.
The impact of that decision has created a palpable sense of danger among political observers and economists alike. There is a growing fear that this transition to caretaker status might have severe negative consequences, particularly in terms of the economy.
The primary concern revolves around the absence of a general budget for the state. Under Iraqi law, a caretaker government is generally incapacitated in the matter of borrowing or proposing new budget bills. This legal paralysis threatens to further disrupt work on critical infrastructure projects and other essential financial issues that require constant funding and executive oversight.
Economic Paralysis and Analyst Warnings
The reaction to the Federal Court's decision has been one of pessimism and worry within financial circles. The absence of any general budget for the state further restricts the government's financial ability to borrow, creating a form of financial instability that could ripple through the entire economy.
Anwar al-Musawi, a prominent political analyst, spoke to Kurdistan24 regarding the timing and implications of the judiciary's move. Expressing deep concern, Musawi questioned the external factors potentially influencing the court.
"We do not know if that decision was issued under pressure or not," Musawi told Kurdistan24, highlighting a potential oversight in the judicial reasoning.
Musawi argued that "the court's decision did not take into account that it causes the disruption of the budget law, and in the event of not passing that law, the investment movement will be completely disrupted."
His analysis points to a catastrophic gap in governance where investment projects, which rely on state spending, will grind to a halt. Musawi suggested that a more prudent approach would have been to delay the dissolution.
"It was necessary that at least the government should have possessed its powers until January of the next year, so that at least the budget law could have been passed, because the stoppage of the government and parliament's work will have negative results," he added.
Fears of Corruption and Public Wealth
However, the narrative surrounding the caretaker government is not entirely unified. Other observers hold a different view, arguing that changing the government to caretaker status was a necessary safeguard.
This perspective suggests that allowing the government to remain with full powers without the interference of the Federal Court would have presented an opportunity for entrenched parties to exploit state resources during the transition period.
Wathiq al-Jabour, an observer of Iraqi affairs, offered a sharp critique of the political class's behavior during transition periods.
"In that period, there might be some parties trying to benefit from the state's public wealth," Jabour explained. He noted that history has shown that "even after the elections, some political forces have tried to conclude political contracts, especially with the absence of a budget and the end of the fiscal year."
Jabour emphasized that the end of the year is often viewed by corrupt actors as a window of opportunity.
"As you also know, the records are sent at the end of the year and they consider that period an opportunity to steal the country's money and wealth," he stated. From this viewpoint, the Federal Court's decision serves as a blunt but effective instrument to freeze public funds and prevent last-minute looting of the treasury before the new administration takes office.
The Road Ahead
As Iraq moves forward from the November elections, the nation faces a dual challenge. On the political front, Nouri al-Maliki’s comments suggest a pathway to consensus is open, provided the Kurds and Sunnis can resolve their internal leadership selections for the Presidency and the Speakership quickly.
The "criteria and conditions" set by the Coordination Framework will likely be the subject of intense negotiation in the coming weeks, determining whether Sudani can secure the confidence of the new parliament.
Simultaneously, the clock is ticking on the economic stability of the nation. The Federal Court decision, while potentially curbing transitional corruption, has placed the economy in a chokehold.
With the powers of the government and parliament reduced to caretaker status, any delay in the formation of the new government poses a direct threat to the livelihood of the state.
As observers have noted, the negative consequences of this deadlock will not be limited to abstract economic indicators but will be felt in the disruption of the borrowing issue, the stalling of projects, and potentially, the critical issue of public sector salaries. The urgency for consensus, therefore, is not merely political, but a matter of national economic survival.
