Fazel Mirani: Iraq a State of ‘Diminished Sovereignty,’ Governed by a Flawed System

ERBIL (Kurdistan24) — In a sweeping and incisive interview, Fazel Mirani, the head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party's (KDP) Political Bureau's Executive Committee, delivered a stark assessment of the post-2003 Iraqi state, describing it as a country of “diminished sovereignty” where the political system and its foundational laws have been designed to perpetuate the dominance of a single component.

Speaking with Kurdistan24 for "Basi Roj" segment with Zhino Mohammed, on Sunday, the veteran Kurdish leader dissected the deep-seated issues plaguing the nation ahead of crucial parliamentary elections, arguing that Iraq’s path is governed not by the constitutional principles of partnership and consensus, but by a majoritarian mentality that has left the federal system fractured and key promises to the Kurdish people unfulfilled. 

Mirani's comprehensive analysis touched upon the flawed election law, the selective implementation of the constitution, the pervasive influence of regional powers, and the internal political dynamics within both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region, painting a picture of a nation at a critical crossroads.

The Electoral Framework: A System of Injustice

With Iraqi parliamentary elections looming, the conversation began with the foundational question of whether the vote would proceed. For Mirani, holding the elections is preferable, despite what he described as a litany of profound shortcomings within the system.

“It is better for the elections to be held,” he stated, before immediately launching into a critique of the political framework that has defined Iraq for nearly two decades. “I cannot say that Iraq is a parliamentary, democratic country as stated in the constitution,” Mirani remarked, setting a critical tone for his evaluation.

He argued that the integrity of the process has been compromised from the outset, from the formation of the electoral commission to the very laws governing the vote. He recalled the first post-2003 election law, which treated all of Iraq as a single constituency, as a more equitable model.

“In my opinion, it was a correct decision by all political forces to make Iraq one district so that no party's vote is lost and someone from Basra could vote for someone in Erbil, and someone from Erbil could vote for a Kurd in Baghdad,” he explained. However, he lamented that subsequent laws have moved away from this principle, a regression that political forces are now beginning to regret.

The current multi-constituency law, according to Mirani, is rife with injustice, not just for the KDP or the Kurds, but for the very concept of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Iraq. He provided a stark numerical example to illustrate the disparity.

“If there are a million voters in Sulaimani, or a million votes are cast, it’s still 18 seats. A million votes in Erbil, it’s 15 seats. A million votes in Duhok, it’s 11 seats,” he noted. 

The threshold for victory further highlights the inequality. While a candidate in the Kurdistan Region might need 15,000 to 20,000 votes to secure a parliamentary seat, “in the southern cities, one can become a member of parliament with 500 or 2,000 votes.”

When asked if this system was designed to be specifically anti-Kurdish, Mirani offered a broader interpretation. “I don’t say it’s against the Kurds. I say there is no justice in the drafting of the law itself,” he clarified, suggesting the inequity affects all of Iraq.

He pointed to the handling of minority quotas as another example of this flawed legal architecture. While the Yazidi community has its designated seat, the Christian quota seats have been made nationwide, allowing non-Christians to vote for Christian candidates. “The injustice lies here,” Mirani asserted.

The core issue, in his analysis, is that the system has been deliberately constructed to ensure a specific outcome. “According to these previous and current laws, they have designed it in a way that the Shiite brothers must be the majority,” he stated unequivocally.

When pressed on his use of the word “design,” he was firm. “They designed it themselves because the judicial authority is in their hands, the commission is in their hands, and they have a majority in parliament.” He revealed that the current law was initially accepted by Kurdish leadership at the request of a US President, with the promise that it would be a one-time measure and that Article 140 would be implemented in return. “But it became permanent,” he said, underscoring a history of broken promises.

This entrenched system of majority rule, he argued, is precisely why the KDP champions the constitutional principles of consensus, partnership, and balance. “We are a nation, the second-largest ethnicity in Iraq. This cannot be imposed on us; it has to be by consensus. This has not been done. All laws are passed by majority and minority.”

Post-2003 Iraq: A selectively Implemented Constitution

Shifting his focus to the broader political process since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Mirani offered a nuanced history. He identified 2005, the year the Iraqi constitution was drafted and ratified, as a turning point.

He credited the Kurdish leadership, particularly President Masoud Barzani, for their tireless efforts to enshrine Kurdish rights within the document. “The constitution, if not implemented selectively, is a good constitution,” he affirmed. “The Iraqi constitution is a good constitution.”

The problem, he elaborated, lies not in the text itself but in its application. “Is it being implemented selectively now?” the host asked. “Definitely,” Mirani replied, explaining that this selective approach harms not only the Kurdistan Region but the very fabric of Iraq’s purported parliamentary system.

He cited the failure to establish the Federal Council as a prime example. Envisioned in the constitution as a second legislative chamber, akin to a Senate, the Federal Council was meant to act as a check on the power of the Council of Representatives.

“If that Federal Council existed, that system of majority and minority in the Iraqi parliament would not always work, it would not succeed, because it would be contradicted,” Mirani explained. The reason for its absence, he argued, is a matter of self-interest for the ruling parties.

“Their interests are not in it,” he stated. The current majority-minority system in the primary legislative body serves their agenda better than a bicameral system that would require broader consensus. When asked if he was referring to the interests of the Shiite parties, he was direct. “Those who rule and govern. The Shiites rule.”

He outlined the de facto power-sharing agreement where the presidency is Kurdish, the speakership is Sunni, and the prime ministership is Shiite, but noted critically that real executive authority is concentrated in the hands of the prime minister.

This reality led him to a stark definition of the past two decades of governance in Iraq. While he refrained from a blanket critique of the Shiite component itself, he characterized the state of the nation in no uncertain terms. “From 2005 until now, Iraq has a government… But Iraq is not a state in the sense of complete sovereignty,” he declared. “I have my own term. I say Iraq is a state with diminished sovereignty.”

A Nation of ‘Diminished Sovereignty’

Expanding on his profound declaration, Mirani detailed the deficiencies that undermine Iraq's sovereignty. He pointed to external influence, territorial violations, and the government's inability to assert control within its own borders. “The sovereignty in Iraq is that a large part of it cannot make decisions without Iran; Turkey has occupied a large part of Iraq, and Iraq cannot get it out,” he said.

Internally, the situation is equally dire. “The Kurdistan Workers' Party is in control in its country, has occupied Sinjar, it cannot... a third of our areas in the regions of Rania and Pshdar and the Bradost and Rekan and Barwari regions… neither Kurdish authority is in it, nor is the authority of the Iraqi government in it,” Mirani detailed. “Okay, so where is the sovereignty?”

The responsibility for this failure, he insisted, lies squarely with the federal government. While regional countries will naturally seek to advance their own interests, it is the duty of a sovereign state to protect its borders and resist foreign interference.

He diagnosed the root cause of this weakness as a failure of Iraq’s political class to transition from an opposition mindset to one of governance.

“The Iraqi opposition parties could not escape from the situation they were in when they were in opposition,” he analyzed. “Each one was affiliated with a country that fed them and helped them… We must move from that dependency and become friends with each other, not followers of each other. This situation has not seen itself in Iraq.” Consequently, he concluded, “the vast majority of political forces in Iraq are satellites of this country or another country.”

Baghdad: The Locus of Both Problem and Solution

Despite this grim assessment, Mirani maintained that the Kurdish political focus must remain on Baghdad. He explained that the KDP’s persistent emphasis on the constitution during its election campaign is a strategic choice rooted in a belief that it remains the most viable path forward.

“Hopelessness is a bad thing,” he said. “One of those ways is the way of the constitution, which is more acceptable than other ways.”

By continually invoking the constitution, the KDP aims to hold its partners in Baghdad accountable to the agreement they jointly forged. “It tells the people, ‘You and I have agreed on this path. Now you are not committing to it. I want to pull you back to commit to it so that there are no problems between you and me.’”

For Mirani, the strategic depth of the Kurdistan Region currently lies in Baghdad. “Our problem is with Baghdad,” he stressed, minimizing the role of regional capitals like Tehran or Istanbul in the core dispute. “The depth of our problem is both the problem and the solution, it is in Iraq, it is in Baghdad.” He clarified, however, that this is the current reality, not a permanent or absolute condition.

He recounted an interview with an Iranian news agency where he articulated a long-term vision: “I said, ‘When the problem between Baghdad and Erbil is resolved, we will become neighbors of each other.’”

This resolution, he argued, hinges on a “maturity of thought” arising in Baghdad—a genuine acceptance that federalism strengthens, rather than weakens, Iraq. If this maturity fails to materialize, he warned, the problems will persist.

He captured the essence of the challenge with a poignant Arabic proverb: “The shadow of a crooked stick will not be straight,” implying that a fundamentally flawed system cannot produce a just outcome.

This flawed mentality is most painfully evident in the ongoing dispute over salaries and the budget. He referenced President Barzani’s recent statement that cutting the livelihoods of Kurdistan’s people was as “painful as the Anfal.” Mirani argued that Baghdad has weaponized the salary issue to undermine the Kurdistan Region’s federal status.

“The salary is not a problem at all, madam, in a federal system,” he stated, explaining that a federal region should receive its constitutionally mandated budget share and manage its own expenditures. Baghdad’s recent push for the “localization” of salaries, he asserted, is a thinly veiled attempt to recentralize power. “I say localization is the usurpation of the will of our federal governance, to move towards a centralized government.”

A Strong KDP for a Strong Kurdistan

Central to resolving these challenges, Mirani argued, is the strength of the Kurdish political position in Baghdad, a strength he directly equates with the electoral success of the KDP. While expressing a nationalist desire for all Kurds to be strong, he asserted that history has proven the KDP’s pivotal role. “We as the Party, think that whenever we were strong, the Kurds were strong. Why were the Kurds strong? We have tried to gather the strength of the Kurds.”

He provided a long historical perspective to underscore the inseparable nature of the KDP and the Kurdish cause. From the September Revolution of 1961 through the peace initiatives of the 1960s and the landmark 1970 Autonomy Accord, all major agreements were made with the Party.

Consequently, he noted, conspiracies and attacks have historically targeted the KDP and the Barzani leadership. “Our enemies have set their strategy that way. They say the Party and the Barzani family, or Barzani… are the heads of the snake.” This dynamic, he insisted, remains true today.

When questioned about what tangible achievements the KDP has secured in Baghdad and what more it could do, he pointed to this historical role as the primary achievement—keeping the Kurdish cause alive and central.

He also acknowledged the vital role both the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) played in the war against ISIS in 2014, stating they “gave a river of blood to protect this country.”

On the question of Kurdish unity in Baghdad, Mirani expressed a measured optimism, acknowledging that the current relationship between the KDP and PUK is “not like before.” He recalled the era of Mam Jalal Talabani as a time when unity was more robust.

Still, he believes a unified Kurdish position on national issues is possible. “I still have hope that for the national issue, we can be of one position together,” he said, citing the unified Kurdish withdrawal from parliament that prevented the passage of the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces) law as a past example of collective action.

Internal Dynamics: Governance and Opposition in Kurdistan

The interview concluded with an introspective look at the political situation within the Kurdistan Region itself. Mirani emphasized that strengthening the home front is a prerequisite for success in Baghdad.

“The formation of the government of the Kurdistan Region should be our priority. Reducing the problems of the Kurdistan Region should be our priority,” he stated. “Because from here we go to Baghdad, our strength from here, we spend it in Baghdad.”

He lamented the delays in forming the new KRG cabinet, attributing the impasse to parties prioritizing their own narrow interests over the national good. As the largest party, Mirani acknowledged that the KDP bears the “lion’s share” of responsibility.

“This is the judgment of history and geography,” he said. He insisted, however, that the KDP has consistently sought to include all parties in a coalition government, even offering key positions to smaller partners in the past. The obstacle, he suggested, comes from other parties choosing to enter opposition.

Mirani then offered a sharp critique of the nature of opposition in the Kurdistan Region, distinguishing between constructive and destructive approaches. A constructive opposition, he said, acknowledges the government's successes while criticizing its failures.

He quoted a hadith: “Woe to a nation that does not say to the good-doer, ‘You have done well,’ and does not say to the evil-doer, ‘You have done wrong.’” He observed that the wisdom of the saying lies in mentioning the good first, as it makes the recipient more open to accepting criticism.

In his view, the opposition in Kurdistan has failed this test. “They say, ‘From the uprising until now, nothing has been done in this country except for bad and theft,’” he recounted. This narrative, he argued, is a disservice to the truth, ignoring the vast progress made in security, infrastructure, education, and public services since 1992.

“These universities? These roads and bridges? … Hasn’t this government done this?” he asked rhetorically.

While acknowledging that much work remains to be done, he called on the opposition to engage in a fairer, more factual comparison between the development in the Kurdistan Region and the rest of Iraq, arguing that such a comparison would highlight the significant achievements of the KRG despite its limited resources.