Allawi Faults Baghdad’s Failures, Praises Kurdish Governance as Model for Iraq

ERBIL (Kurdistan24) – In a wide-ranging and critically significant interview that touched upon the fragile geopolitical position of Iraq, the complexities of government formation, and the enduring struggle for Kurdish rights, Dr. Ayad Allawi, the head of the National Coalition and the first Prime Minister of post-Ba’athist Iraq, delivered a stark message regarding the country’s future direction.

Speaking exclusively to Kurdistan24’s "Basi Roj" (Topic of the Day) program with presenter Zhino Mohammed on Monday, Allawi asserted that Iraq cannot stand on its own feet without American assistance and warned against aligning with Iran, citing Tehran’s international isolation and regional entanglements.

The veteran politician, who was in Erbil for high-level talks, also offered a robust defense of the Kurdistan Region’s constitutional entitlements, characterizing the region’s governance as a "very successful experience" while calling for a complete overhaul of Iraq’s electoral system to unify the fractured nation.

The interview took place shortly after Allawi held a significant meeting with President Masoud Barzani, a figure Allawi affectionately referred to as his "brother."

When asked by Zhino Mohammed to disclose the nature of their discussion, Allawi emphasized the depth of his historical relationship with the Kurdish leadership. He described himself as not only a political ally but a close friend who has stood by the Kurds during their darkest periods.

He recalled the dual hardships the Kurds faced in the past—suffering under the international embargo placed on Iraq while simultaneously enduring an internal embargo imposed by the Iraqi government.

Allawi highlighted the mutual support between his political faction and the Kurdish people, noting that this solidarity has existed at both the popular and political levels. The meeting with President Barzani, according to Allawi, focused heavily on the chaotic aftermath of the recent elections and the labyrinthine process of forming a new Iraqi government.

Addressing the timing of his visit, which coincided with the presence of Nouri al-Maliki in Erbil, Allawi was quick to clarify that his trip was entirely independent. He stated that he had engaged in a long-overdue meeting with President Barzani to address the Kurdish leader’s legitimate fears regarding the implementation of the Iraqi constitution.

Allawi expressed full support for President Barzani’s demands, particularly regarding the election law and the mechanisms of governance. He pinpointed the root causes of the current political stalemate, identifying them not merely as superficial electoral disputes but as fundamental structural issues.

Specifically, Allawi pointed to the unimplemented Article 140 of the constitution, which addresses disputed territories, and the contentious second paragraph related to oil and gas revenues. He stressed that without resolving the management of natural resources, the political landscape would remain unstable.

On the critical issue of constitutional adherence, Allawi validated the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) insistence that the constitution is the core solution to Iraq's problems. He acknowledged a systemic failure in Baghdad, describing a persistent "evasion" of the Kurdish issue, particularly in financial terms.

Reflecting on his tenure as Prime Minister, Allawi reminded viewers that he had ensured the Kurdistan Region received its full financial entitlements, specifically the 17 percent share of the budget, a practice that has since eroded.

He validated President Barzani’s concerns regarding the constitution and the oil and gas dossier as entirely justified, admitting that despite his own efforts five years ago, these problems remain unresolved and require a decisive solution today.

A significant portion of the interview was dedicated to the structural flaws of Iraq’s electoral system. Allawi proposed a radical return to the single-district model he implemented during the first post-Saddam elections.

He argued that Iraq needs to be one electoral district to eliminate the fragmentation that currently plagues the nation. Under his vision, a closed-list system would represent all of Iraq, ensuring that a vote cast in Sulaimani, Erbil, or Baghdad carries equal weight and national significance.

He lamented the current system, where the evasion of distinct names and the division of districts have deepened schisms among the populace. For Allawi, treating Iraq as a single district is essential to reaffirming that it is one country with one people, a view he noted aligns with the observations of President Barzani.

When pressed by Mohammed on whether elections could truly change the political map of Iraq, Allawi acknowledged that while changes do occur, the process has devolved. He criticized the exorbitant amounts of money spent on the electoral process, describing a shift in the nature of political conflict in Iraq.

The veteran leader observed that the country has transitioned from an era of armed conflict and force to a new, equally destructive phase: a "conflict of elections and spending money." He termed this a fatal mistake, noting that millions are squandered by main players and external parties to influence results, while the fundamental needs of the country go unmet.

Regarding the agenda for the next Iraqi government, Allawi insisted that it must prioritize the welfare of all Iraqis rather than serving the interests of a political majority or specific parties. He called for a government that includes both the winners and those who were not successful in the elections, emphasizing inclusivity.

He reiterated his support for the Kurds’ demand to pass critical legislation, such as the oil and gas law, which many view as a potential economic savior for the country. Allawi dismissed the notion that the Kurds are adversaries, stating firmly that Iraqis are one people—Kurds, Arabs, Sunnis, and Shiites—and that the demands of the Kurdistan Region must be met not as concessions to an enemy, but as rights of fellow citizens.

He urged for dialogue as the primary mechanism to solve outstanding issues between Erbil and Baghdad, rejecting the hostile rhetoric employed by some political parties.

The conversation then shifted to the allocation of Iraq’s sovereign positions, specifically the presidency, which has by custom been held by a Kurd. Allawi suggested that while political customs regarding the distribution of the three presidencies among Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites could theoretically change in the future, such changes must occur through dialogue and mutual understanding, not unilateral action.

He stressed the importance of defining the duties of the President, recalling that in 2010, the Americans had suggested he take the presidency.

He refused at the time, arguing that the role required the ability to execute reforms, not just sit idly.

In the current context, Allawi affirmed that the Kurds are acutely aware of the stakes and that their demand to retain the presidency is legitimate. He argued that any changes to this custom are unnecessary in the current volatile situation and that the post should remain with the Kurds within the framework of the law and political agreements.

On the topic of the premiership, Allawi expressed hope that the current Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, would secure a second term, stating that he encourages Sudani to take the role again. However, he offered a grim prediction regarding the ease of this process.

Allawi frankly assessed that the Coordination Framework would likely face a difficult, long, and drawn-out conflict over naming the prime minister. He attributed this difficulty to the presence of external parties and deep-seated internal disagreements over the results of the election, the oil and gas law, and the very definition of federalism.

He noted that the concept of federalism remains ambiguous in Iraq, with no clear consensus on what it entails or what the Kurds’ specific entitlements are within that system.

Allawi was equally skeptical about the new political councils formed by Sunni factions. He observed a proliferation of such agreements—Kurds with Kurds, Shiites with Shiites, and Sunnis with Sunnis—but predicted their failure.

He argued that these sectarian alignments are fraught with internal hostility and unresolved problems, particularly in their relations with the Kurds, further complicating the national political landscape.

Perhaps the most emphatic moment of the interview came when Zhino Mohammed asked about Iraq’s foreign policy orientation amidst the rapid changes in the Middle East.

Allawi was unequivocal: "Iraq should not align itself with Iran." He reasoned that Iran is currently "internationally targeted" and embroiled in severe problems across the region, listing Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and Syria as theaters of Iranian difficulty. In contrast, Allawi argued that an agreement with the United States is far better for Iraq’s interests.

He stated bluntly that America has no such problems in the region compared to Tehran. When asked if Iraq could stand on its own feet without the U.S., Allawi replied, "No, of course it cannot." He asserted that without American help, Iraq cannot withstand the myriad problems it faces.

He recalled his own past efforts to unite the Iraqi political spectrum with the help of President Masoud Barzani and the late Jalal Talabani to form a non-sectarian front, a vision that was ultimately rejected by Islamic parties who sought to enforce sectarian divides.

In his concluding remarks, Allawi offered a glowing assessment of the Kurdistan Region. When asked to evaluate the experience of the Region after more than 20 years, he described it as a "very successful experience."

He praised the Kurdish leadership for preserving relations with the rest of Iraq while building a functional and prosperous region. He contrasted this success with what he termed the failure of the "American experience" in federal Iraq.

According to Allawi, the American strategy failed because it inadvertently paved the way for Iran to control the situation. He cited the 2010 elections as a prime example, where despite his success at the ballot box, both Iran and the United States stood against him, effectively undermining a non-sectarian outcome.

The interview concluded with Allawi reaffirming his friendship with the Kurdish people and his commitment to advocating for their constitutional rights within a unified, sovereign Iraq allied with the West.

His insights provided a detailed roadmap of the challenges facing the next government, from the "fatal mistake" of monetized elections to the imperative of defining federalism and resolving the oil and gas dispute.