Iraqi PM Says Iraq Can’t Curb Armed Factions Until U.S.-Led Forces Depart

ERBIL (Kurdistan24) – In a significant and carefully worded declaration that lays bare the central paradox of Iraq's security dilemma, the Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has asserted that his government's pledge to bring all weapons under the control of the state can only be fulfilled once the U.S.-led international coalition has completely withdrawn from the country.

This stark linkage, made in an interview with Reuters on Monday, effectively frames the continued American military presence as the primary obstacle to disarming the powerful, often Iran-backed, armed factions that challenge the state's authority, arguing that as long as these groups can portray the coalition as an "occupying force," the political and practical conditions for their disarmament will remain out of reach.

The Prime Minister's statement is an effort of political triangulation, an attempt to navigate the treacherous crosscurrents of intense American pressure to curb these very factions, the deep-seated influence of those same groups within his own ruling coalition, and the ever-present shadow of his powerful neighbor, Iran.

As Iraq heads into a contentious parliamentary election on November 11, Sudani's carefully calibrated position seeks to placate his domestic allies, reassure Washington of his long-term intentions, and assert a vision of Iraqi sovereignty that is contingent on the departure of all foreign forces, a stance that stands in direct and dramatic contrast to the escalating demands and warnings emanating from Washington and its regional allies.

Prime Minister Sudani's interview with Reuters provided the clearest articulation yet of his government's official position on the deeply intertwined issues of the U.S. presence and the proliferation of non-state armed groups.

He confirmed that a plan remains in place for the "multinational anti-Islamic State coalition" to fully exit Iraq by September 2026, arguing that the threat from the militant group has "eased considerably."

This timeline, he suggested, is the necessary precursor to any serious effort to establish a state monopoly on the use of force.

"There is no ISIS. Security and stability? Thank God it's there," he stated, questioning the continued justification for the presence of a coalition that has involved 86 different countries since its formation in 2014.

"So give me the excuse for the presence of 86 states," he added.

It is only after this "excuse" is removed, he argued, that the government can effectively move to assert its authority over the powerful militias that have become deeply embedded in the Iraqi state.

"Then, for sure there will be a clear program to end any arms outside of state institutions. This is the demand of all," he said, outlining a potential path for these groups to either integrate into the official security forces or to enter the political process after laying down their arms.

When asked about the growing international pressure on Iran's regional "Axis of Resistance," of which many Iraqi factions are a part, Sudani was cautious but firm in asserting Iraq's unique position and its autonomy in matters of war and peace.

"The situation here is different than Lebanon," he insisted. "Iraq is clear in its stances to maintain security and stability and that state institutions have the decision over war and peace, and that no side can pull Iraq to war or conflict."

While navigating this security minefield, Prime Minister Sudani has simultaneously been orchestrating a major economic pivot, actively courting American and European investment as a top priority for his government.

His interview was replete with details of major new deals and a clear message that Iraq is open for business with the West, creating a complex dynamic where he is seeking massive investment from a country whose military presence he calls the main obstacle to internal security.

"There is a clear, intensive and qualitative entrance of U.S. companies into Iraq," Sudani said, highlighting a landmark agreement with General Electric for 24,000 megawatts of power, and new deals with U.S. energy giants Chevron, Excelerate, and ExxonMobil.

This push is a key part of his strategy to achieve energy self-sufficiency by 2027 and end Iraq's costly reliance on gas imports from Iran.

With the November 11 election looming, Sudani is running for a second term as a "builder-in-chief," confidently predicting a "significant victory," though his achievements have been fueled by a record-breaking budget and a massive expansion of the state bureaucracy.

"My fear is that the implementation of reforms is delayed,” he admitted.

A Direct Collision with US Policy and a Region on Edge?

Prime Minister Sudani's stark precondition for disarmament—the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces—places his government on a direct collision course with the stated and escalating policy of the United States and its allies.

While Sudani frames the U.S. presence as the primary obstacle to state control, Washington sees the Iran-backed militias themselves as the primary threat to Iraqi sovereignty and regional stability, and has made it clear that its patience is wearing thin.

As previously reported by Kurdistan24, this American impatience has recently manifested in a series of direct and unambiguous warnings. In a dramatic escalation, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth delivered a "final notice" to his Iraqi counterpart in a phone call, threatening direct U.S. military action if these armed factions interfere with planned American operations in the region.

This stern military threat was followed by a powerful inaugural statement from the newly appointed U.S. Special Envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya, who, under the banner of "MAKE IRAQ GREAT AGAIN," declared that "there is no place for armed groups operating outside the authority of the state" and that a sovereign Iraq must be "free from malign external interference, including from Iran and its proxies."

Sudani's statement to Reuters appears to be a direct, albeit diplomatically phrased, response to this pressure.

It is a public declaration that Washington's primary demand—the dismantling of the militias—is contingent on Washington's own actions.

This creates a dangerous chicken-and-egg scenario, a diplomatic and security impasse with no clear resolution.

The U.S. will not leave until the threat from the militias is neutralized, and according to the Iraqi Prime Minister, the militias cannot be neutralized until the U.S. leaves.

This standoff is further complicated by the stark reality of the Iraqi state's own capacity to enforce its will.

Sudani's promise of a "clear program to end any arms outside of state institutions" following a U.S. withdrawal is fundamentally challenged by the government's own track record.

As Kurdistan24 reported, with an estimated seven million weapons operating outside of government control in Iraq, a recent Interior Ministry registration program, active for over a year, managed to register only 125,000 firearms.

This dramatic failure raises a critical question: even if the U.S. were to withdraw, does the Iraqi state possess the actual coercive power and political will to confront and disarm the powerful, well-entrenched, and politically connected militias that make up a significant portion of the PMF?

The evidence suggests that it does not, a fact that undermines the very premise of Sudani's argument and likely reinforces Washington's skepticism.

The pressure on Baghdad is not just coming from Washington. As also previously reported by Kurdistan24, citing a detailed analysis from the Israeli news website Walla, Israel's intelligence and military establishment has shifted its focus to a "developing threat" from Iraq.

Israeli military sources have warned that Iran is pouring significant resources into its proxy militias in Iraq, turning the country into a potential launchpad for missile, drone, and even ground attacks against Israel.

The IDF and Mossad are reportedly actively preparing for these scenarios. This means that the actions—or inactions—of the Iraqi government regarding these factions are now being watched with intense interest not only in Washington, but also in Tel Aviv, adding another layer of regional volatility to the situation.

Complicating Sudani's position even further is the urgent strategic recalibration underway in Tehran. As detailed in another Kurdistan24 report, the commander of Iran's elite Quds Force, Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, made a quiet, low-profile visit to Baghdad just last week.

His mission was not one of aggression, but of preservation: to mend the "ferocious rivalries" within Iraq's ruling Shiite Coordination Framework and prevent the splintering of what has become the last reliable cornerstone of Tehran's battered "axis of resistance."

Qaani's visit comes at a moment of acute vulnerability for Iran. With its proxies severely degraded—Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza—and its key state ally in Syria, Bashar al-Assad, having fallen, Iran's strategic depth has eroded dramatically.

Iraq, as one analysis put it, remains its "only theater to recalibrate its regional axis."

For Tehran, preserving its influence in Baghdad, primarily through the armed factions Sudani is being pressured to disarm, is no longer just about projecting power; it is about survival. This makes it highly unlikely that Iran would stand by and allow its most critical remaining strategic asset to be dismantled, regardless of the timeline, placing Sudani in an even more impossible position between his American partners and his powerful Iranian-allied neighbors and domestic partners.

As he campaigns for another term, Prime Minister Sudani is presenting himself as the man who can deliver both security and prosperity. Yet, his own words reveal the profound and perhaps intractable dilemma at the heart of his governance.

His vision of a prosperous, stable, and sovereign Iraq, open to Western investment, is conditioned on the departure of the U.S. military. But that same departure, in the eyes of Washington and its allies, would remove the primary check on the very armed factions that Sudani himself acknowledges must be disarmed, and which are now more critical than ever to Iran's regional survival.

The outcome of the upcoming election, and the complex negotiations that will follow, will determine whether this circle can be squared, or if Iraq is destined to remain a battleground for the competing interests of its powerful allies and its internal armed actors.