“I Want to Make Iraq Great Again”: Trump’s New Slogan for Iraq and What It Means

ERBIL (Kurdistan24) — “I want to make Iraq great again.” That striking choice of wording—echoing Donald Trump’s iconic campaign slogan, “Make America Great Again”—now appears as the central message of Mark Savaya, the newly appointed U.S. Special Envoy to Iraq.

In a recent interview with Chaldean Press, Savaya laid out his vision for the country, declaring his mission to strengthen the U.S.–Iraq relationship, deliver peace and stability, and tap Iraq’s unrealized potential. He expressed optimism: “Iraq is getting better each day, with no limits to its potential.”

Savaya’s invocation of a familiar Trump-era phrase underscores both continuity and change—a calculated branding, but one that carries significant implications for Iraq’s domestic politics, regional pressures (especially from Iran-aligned militias), and the prospects for Iraqi Kurdistan.

I would like to thank Chaldean Press for the opportunity to discuss my vision for strengthening relations between the United States and the Republic of Iraq. Excerpt below:

"Mark Savaya, the first U.S. Special Envoy to Iraq in history!

Mark Savaya, a proud Chaldean, born in… pic.twitter.com/S8IbQPT0vP

— Mark Savaya (@Mark_Savaya) October 24, 2025

A Familiar Slogan with New Bearings

Savaya’s slogan deliberately mirrors Trump’s American refrain, and this is strategic. The phrase “make X great again” has become a rallying cry—a promise of revival, reclamation, and renewal.

In an Iraqi context, it taps into frustrations with governance failures, corruption, sectarian division, and neglect. For many Iraqis disillusioned by successive administrations, the idea of restoring dignity, sovereignty, and functional statehood is deeply appealing.

However, the slogan is double-edged. While it offers a vision of renewal, it also raises expectations—to the degree that failure or overpromising could backfire.

For Iraq, the challenges are profound: political gridlock, entrenched militia influence, weak institutions, sectarian fault lines, economic distress, and continuous foreign interference (notably from Iran). Savaya’s “great again” mantra will be tested early against those obstacles.

Moreover, the slogan frames the U.S. role as one of return or rescue, potentially casting Trump-era policy toward Iraq as corrective compared to perceived failures of previous U.S. administrations. It signals that Savaya intends to operate with bold rhetorical weight, not as a conventional diplomat.

Implications for Iran-Aligned Militias

One of the most immediate and sensitive challenges Savaya faces is how to deal with Iran-backed militias that maintain strong influence in Iraq’s security and political landscapes.

These Shiite militias—some integrated into state structures, others more autonomous—play both overt and covert roles in local governance, security, and foreign policy alignment.

Savaya’s appointment could be perceived by these groups as a shift in U.S. posture. His assertive rhetoric and explicit ambition for structural reform may signal that the Trump administration wants to reassert U.S. leverage in Iraq—pressuring Iraq’s government to restrain militia influence, enforce monopoly of force through state institutions, and reorient security cooperation in a more U.S.-friendly direction.

Yet, Savaya alone cannot uproot them. The militias are deeply embedded: financially, politically, and socially. Their relations with Iran, their patronage networks, and local legitimacy in many Shia communities make direct confrontation risky.

Instead, Savaya may aim for a more tactical approach: encouraging Baghdad to strengthen rule-of-law, transparency, oversight of security forces, and limiting parallel militia structures.

He may work quietly with reform-minded Iraqi actors, push for U.S. oversight in aid and military cooperation, and attempt to reshape the narrative: militias as spoilers rather than protectors.

Still, if his activities are perceived by militias or their political allies as a U.S. attempt to influence Iraq’s sovereignty, it could provoke backlash—both political and security-based. Therefore, much depends on how softly or forcefully Savaya applies leverage.

Why a Special Envoy? Comparing Savaya with Trump’s Prior Envoys

Trump’s choice to appoint a special envoy to Iraq—rather than relying solely on the U.S. ambassador—is notable and reflects his preference for personal emissaries. Comparing Savaya to Trump’s other Middle East envoys helps illuminate what this role may entail and how it diverges from traditional diplomacy.

Jared Kushner — Perhaps the most high-profile Trump envoy, Kushner led the U.S. peace push in the Israel–Palestine arena and broader Middle East normalization efforts. He is a family member, wielded broad informal authority, and bypassed conventional diplomatic channels. His role exemplified personalized, deal-driven diplomacy.

Steve Witkoff — As Special Envoy to the Middle East, Witkoff bridges economic and strategic initiatives, often focusing on ceasefires, regional alignments, and diplomacy outside normal State Department circuits. His background is in real estate, not foreign service, emphasizing that Trump values loyalty, deal-making, and outsider status over credentialed career diplomats.

Tom Barrack — While not an envoy in Iraq, Barrack has been closely involved in regional diplomacy, serving in various roles, including U.S. envoy to Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon. He has been a longtime Trump associate and trusted advisor.

Savaya’s appointment fits this pattern: a trusted political actor, rather than a career diplomat, entrusted with executing the president’s strategic vision. The advantage is direct access, agility, and alignment with Trump’s priorities.

The risk is bypassing institutional constraints, sparking diplomatic friction, and lacking deep institutional knowledge.

Choosing a special envoy in Iraq signals that the Trump administration views Iraq not as another portfolio in the State Department—but as a key arena needing direct, elevated attention.

It suggests that Washington wants a more muscular, personally accountable presence in Baghdad, capable of navigating political, security, and regional tensions.

Kurdistan, and Savaya’s Role

Savaya’s known respect and affinity toward Kurdistan and Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani must be seen as more than symbolic. In Iraq’s fraught political architecture, Kurdistan wields significant leverage—not just demographically and politically, but economically (oil, cross-border trade).

A U.S. envoy sympathetic to Kurdish priorities could tilt the balance in federal relations, offering the Kurdistan region renewed hope for constitutional, economic, and political rights.

Under Savaya’s role, several developments become possible:

Advocacy at the federal level: Savaya may become a more effective interlocutor for Kurdish concerns—disputes over budget allocations, control of territories, revenue sharing, checkpoints, and federal representation. His proximity to U.S. policymaking could translate into pressure on Baghdad to uphold Kurdish constitutional guarantees.

Greater visibility and legitimacy: Kurdish leaders, especially President Barzani, may gain more influence in Washington–Baghdad discussions through Savaya’s mediation. His positive posture toward Kurdistan could help mainstream Kurdish demands in U.S. policy.

Economic and infrastructure initiatives: If Savaya helps channel U.S. involvement in infrastructure, energy, and development projects to include Kurdistan, this could strengthen the region’s autonomy. U.S. backing for cross-border trade, pipelines, and foreign investment could give Erbil more leverage in negotiations with Baghdad.

Security and defense cooperation: The Kurdish Peshmerga, historically a U.S. partner in counterinsurgency operations, may see stronger advocacy under Savaya’s tenure, potentially boosting Kurdish security capability and claims of shared Iraqi defense responsibilities.

However, caution is needed. Baghdad, sensitive to U.S. influence and wary of Kurdish assertiveness, may resist overt favoritism. Iranian-backed Shiite parties may see Kurdish empowerment as a threat. 

Looking ahead

Mark Savaya’s adoption of the slogan “I want to make Iraq great again” frames his mission with grand ambition. It positions him as a bold, high-visibility player in Iraq’s contested political landscape.

But success depends on execution, diplomacy, and restraint amid competing forces: entrenched militias, fragile institutions, sectarian divisions, and regional influence, especially from Iran.

His close connection to Kurdistan offers a unique opportunity to elevate Kurdish concerns within U.S.–Iraq diplomacy. If Savaya uses this role thoughtfully, he may serve as a bridge—bolstering Iraq’s unity while protecting Kurdish rights.

The coming months will reveal whether “Make Iraq Great Again” will be more than a motivating slogan—and whether Savaya becomes the change he promises, or merely a flashpoint in Iraq’s intricate politics.